The Uses of History in Struggles for Racial Justice: Colonizing the Past and Managing Memory by Franke, Katherine M.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2000 
The Uses of History in Struggles for Racial Justice: Colonizing the 
Past and Managing Memory 
Katherine M. Franke 
Columbia Law School, kfranke@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Legal History 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine M. Franke, The Uses of History in Struggles for Racial Justice: Colonizing the Past and 
Managing Memory, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1673 (2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/715 
This Response/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship 
Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship 
Archive. For more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
THE USES OF HISTORY IN STRUGGLES FOR RACIAL JUSTICE:
COLONIZING THE PAST AND MANAGING MEMORY
Katherine M. Franke
In this Commentary, Professor Katherine Franke offers an analysis on Richard
Delgado and Jean Stefancic's California's Racial History and Constitutional
Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education and
Rebecca Tsosie's Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse
of Treaty Rights. These two Articles, she observes, deploy history for the purposes
of justifying certain contemporary normative claims on behalf of peoples of color:
affirmative action in higher education for Delgado and Stefancic, and sovereignty
rights for native peoples in Tsosie's case. Franke explores the manner in which stories
of past conquest and discrimination contribute to contemporary conceptions of racial
and ethnic identity and status, which in turn form the basis of rights claims. Drawing
from sociological distinctions between remembrance, memory and history, Franke
suggests that legal claims for amends prospectively demand more than reference
back to an ignoble past, and she cautions against strategies that ground a right to
redress in the status of people of color. Similarly, she examines the manner in which
postcolonial arguments that seek to reinvigorate claims to sovereignty for native
people run the risk of fetishizing the primitive.
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INTRODUCTION
The path of development that has brought the United States to this cur-
rent period of enormous prosperity is undeniably littered with abominable racial
violence, genocide, enslavement, discrimination, and structural subordination.
Yet, our national identity remains grounded in notions of merit, opportunity,
successful assimilation, and the promise of a rising tide lifting all boats. We feel
much more comfortable acknowledging and condemning horrors pocking the
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Thanks to Chantal Thomas and
Ren~e R6mkens for comments on earlier drafts of this Commentary.
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national figures of other nations, such as the genocide undertaken by Nazis or
the warring parties in the Balkans, than we feel owning the evil in our own
past. The Holocaust Memorial in Washington, D.C. is one of the most often
visited monuments in our nation's capital, but we have yet to officially acknowl-
edge the evil perpetrated here at home against persons of African descent,
not to mention the mass slaughter of the native people who were found here
when Europeans "discovered" America.
Consequently, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic's California's Racial
History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher
Education' and Rebecca Tsosie's Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the
Discourse of Treaty Rights,2 make significant contributions to the project of
stopping up the Orwelian "memory hole" into which vast and hideous dimen-
sions of our domestic past have seemed to disappear from our collective
memories. They, like other scholars of U.S. racial history, provide an antidote
to what at turns seems to be the amnesia, denial, repression, or flat out dishon-
esty of those who refuse to relate the current racial order to a violent racial
past for which we bear an ongoing responsibility of redress.
Yet, neither of these two excellent papers are framed merely as "set-the-
record-straight" projects. They both go further and demand that a normative
injunction necessarily flows from these histories, memories, and facts. Thus, I
applaud the story-telling aspects of both papers, and my comments herein
largely address the normative projects they undertake by posing a set of ques-
tions that these papers provoke. All of these questions derive from founda-
tional notions about the uses of history and memory in contemporary struggles
for equality and sovereignty.
What use should we make of these ugly "truths" from our oft-whitewashed
past? What is or can be the normative force of stories of historical victimiza-
tion? What are their ethical imperatives? Do, or should, rights flow directly
from the wrongs of the past, like diagnosis to prescription? Delgado and
Stefancic are undoubtedly right when they tell us that "the past does indeed
make a difference,"3 but how?
For Delgado and Stefancic as well as for Tsosie, the past must play a
significant, if not determinative, role in contemporary efforts to define national
identity, whether the identity of the United States or tribal identity, and
to further social justice through the use of legal instruments, such as the
Fourteenth Amendment or treaties. Yet, how does the past figure in these
1. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, California's Racial History and Constitutional Rationales
for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1521 (2000).
2. Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1615 (2000).
3. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1, at 1531.
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works, given that the present inevitably forms the frame through which we
view particular pasts? Perhaps the better question has to do with the manner
in which the past is being managed by these authors for present purposes.
Surely what they are up to is, in significant part, the correction of collective
memory. How do the telling of history, the recounting of memory, and the
relating of remembrance figure in the righting of old wrongs? What role do
they play in a restructuring of identity that takes seriously the poison of struc-
tural subordination and the cultural genocide of colonialism? In the end, both
papers suggest a connection between collective memory and collective identity
in the following sense: "We are a people who have lived for generations
with the horror of slaughter on the plains, with enslavement, and with betrayal
of the promises contained in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo...." All three
authors are well warned to steer shy of the fetishization of memory in such a
manner that echoes the mistakes of the Serbs, for instance, for whom atrocities
that took place in 1389 risk having greater significance than recent events,
or worse, forming the normative justification for atrocities undertaken today.
In this Commentary, I develop two parallel concerns about the uses of
history, memory, and remembrance, particularly as such uses relate to the mod-
em constructions of justice and identity. In Part I, I explore the relationships
between history, memory, and remembrance, with an eye to the challenges
presented by contemporary claims for redress grounded in past experiences of
injury. This discussion focuses primarily on Delgado and Stefancic's California's
Racial History.
In Part II, I explore a related set of questions triggered by Tsosie's Sacred
Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, wherein the
postcolonial assertion of authentic Indian identity resists an assimilation narra-
tive of the United States by reference to the performative power of treaty mak-
ing. Here, Tsosie consciously refuses the turn to hybridity so popular with many
postcolonial theorists, but in so doing, she risks the fetishization of the primi-
tive. Her principle challenge appears to be to enunciate a sovereign Indian
nation while avoiding what I call a kind of self-Orientalization.
In both Articles, the past is managed so as to justify a particularly eman-
cipatory future. A form of pre-European conquest nationalism does much
of the work for Tsosie, while Delgado and Stefancic cast their lot with Martin
Luther King, Jr., who gave voice to the notion of a debtor and a creditor race.4
4. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream" speech introduced this concept
in 1963:
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her
citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given
the Negro people a bad check; a check that has come back marked "insufficient funds."
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I. "THOSE WHO Do NOT LEARN THE LESSONS OF HISTORY ARE
DOOMED TO REPEAT THEM" 5
The tone, the texture, and the passion of Delgado and Stefancic's thorough
and convincing recounting of California's disgraceful racial past has the feel
not of a detached historical record, but rather of repressed or denied memory
being recovered. There is the therapeutic pain of the abusive parent from the
past being revealed to the traumatized adult-child of the present that resonates
throughout this piece. Yet, unlike the therapeutic trope that promises that
remembrance is all one needs to make one whole again,6 in the domain of edu-
cational equality, illumination of a shameful past triggers a demand for affirma-
tive measures into the foreseeable future! These affirmative remedies are
construed as make whole in nature and are justified by the normative demands
of the past injuries once revealed.
Yet, how can raw revelation nominate cooked remedies so self-evidently?
James Baldwin began his Notes of a Native Son with the observation that "the
past is all that makes the present coherent, and further, that the past will
remain horrible for exactly as long as we refuse to assess it honestly."8 In these
"Autobiographical Notes," Baldwin signals both the importance of memory
to present identity, and the degree to which redress or healing demands an
analysis of the remembered past. Surely, the lessons of the past, if there are
any, emanate from interpretation, analysis, and criticism, not merely from reve-
lation. It is this gap, if you will, between the story that Delgado and Stefancic
tell and the redress that story necessarily justifies that I wish to examine. The
ought cannot leap right out of Delgado and Stefancic's is without somewhat
more work.
More than a half century ago, French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs
began to tease apart remembrance, memory, and history as he investigated
the ways in which collective memory figured into national or collective identity.
Collective memory, he argued, functions as "essentially a reconstruction of
But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that
there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this Nation. So we have come
to cash this check-a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and security
of justice.
109 CONG. REC. 16,242 (1963) (speech by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
5. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1, at 1613 (capitalization added). Richard Delgado and
Jean Stefancic repeat a common misquotation of George Santayana's familiar invective. Santayana
actually wrote: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." GEORGE
SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1920) (emphasis added).
6. Judith Herman has made important contributions to the psychoanalytic literature regarding
memory of trauma. See generally JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992).
7. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1, at 1525.
8. JAMES BALDWIN, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 6 (1955).
1677
the past [that] adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual
needs of the present."9 By building a continuity with the past, memory does
the work of laying the foundation for identity, on an individual and a cultural
level."0 Halbwachs reasoned that
through its tradition a group colonizes the past by locating images of its
values in a landscape of time, much as a nation-state colonizes a territory
through the architecture with which it reshapes its topography. The
most powerful group crowds out the traditions of competing groups, or
reshapes them to conform to its own conceptions.11
In this respect, memory, collectivized over a population, is the basis of cultural
identity and social order.
Thus conceived, memory is to be distinguished from remembrance and
from history. Rather than a reliable mental snapshot that we pull forth to
accurately remind us of the past, memory is socially mediated as a present
judgment about what to trust, emphasize, repress, or deny from our remem-
bered past. Memory, as such, must be understood as a system of "organiz[ed]
knowledge-of giving priority to some things, while consigning others to
oblivion.""
Memory, understood as remembrance that is organized for present pur-
poses, has a special character to it insofar as it operates as a live link to the
past. It is dynamic and, as Pierre Nora has observed, "subject to the dialectic
of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of the distortions to which it is
subject, vulnerable in various ways to appropriation and manipulation, and
capable of lying dormant for long periods of time only to be suddenly reawak-
ened." 3 In this respect, the past is always present as both conscious and uncon-
scious memory that exerts enormous influence on our present actions and
feelings and our future dreams and fears.
While there may be a present purpose to the shape of our memories,
that purpose is by no means an entirely deliberate or conscious one. Yet, it
is the vitality of memory, its vivacity, and the sense of it being "ours" that make
9. . Barry Schwartz, Iconography and Collective Memory: Lincoln's Image in the American Mind,
32 Soc..Q. 301,303 (1991) (citing MAURICE HALBWACHS, LA TOPOGRAPHIE LGENDAIRE DES
EVANGILES EN TERRE SAINTE 7 (1941)).
10. "We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced;
through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated." MAURICE
HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 47 (Lewis A. Coser trans., 1992).
11. Patrick H. Hutton, The Role of Memory in the Historiography of the French Revolution, 30
HIST. & THEORY 56, 58.(1991).
12. Patrick H. Hutton, Mnemonic Schemes in the New History of Memory, 36 HIST. & THEORY
378, 381 (1997) (reviewing MATT K. MATSUDA, THE MEMORY OF THE MODERN (1996) and SIMON
SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY (1995)).
13. 1 PIERRE NORA, REALMS OF MEMORY: RETHINKING THE FRENCH PAST 3 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1996).
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it so powerful and that render it so constitutive of identity-on the individual
level, as well as on the cultural, social, and national levels. 14 Describing
how "[i]n our image of the Negro breathes the past we deny,"'5 James Baldwin
observed that "[t]he man does not remember the hand that struck him, the
darkness that frightened him, as a child; nevertheless, the hand and the dark-
ness remain with him, indivisible from himself forever, part of the passion that
drives him wherever he thinks to take flight."'6 Similarly, with the familiar and
determined demand to "Never Forget," Jews insist that we retain both indi-
vidual and collective present memory of the Nazi Holocaust. This demand
is premised on the belief that the cultivation of a living memory of evil from
the past will create a shield against its happening again. This move reduces
events to mythic archetypes for present purposes, as part of what Peter Novick
has recently described as "the management of Holocaust memory."'"
But the cultivation of collective memory can do more than provide a
shield against the repetition of evil. The reiteration and sacralization of various
founding myths or archetypal stories shape both memory and identity of both
nations and peoples. "These ideas represent, if you will, the consciousness that
society has of itself in its present situation.... The older they are, the stronger
they will be; the greater the number of people and the more widespread the
groups that have adopted them, the more potent these representations
become."'9 The Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Recon-
struction Era amendments to the Constitution, and more recently, the U. S.
14. One of the most impressive instances of identity-based memory work pertains to the
Pequot Indians' recent use of anthropologists to reconstruct authentic Pequot culture for descendants
of this tribe who no longer remembered substantial aspects of their ancestors' tribal ways. These
anthropologists were hired as memory workers to reconstruct and transform Pequot tribal history
into present memory. Pequot identity, once revived, then formed the basis for the Pequot people's
claim to gaming rights in Connecticut. See, e.g., Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty,
and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711,724-28 (1996). Pierre Nora discusses
the way in which present identity is often "grafted onto and rooted in what went before." 1 NORA,
supra note 13, at 12.
15. BALDWIN, supra note 8, at 28.
16. Id. at 29.
17. This use of "Never Forget" in the service of "Never Again" has also animated some of the
recent truth and reconciliation commissions that were designed to "preserve the memory of the
victims, [so as to] promote a culture of mutual respect and observance of human rights." Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Overview, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
147, 158 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (quoting the Commission for the Historical Clarification
of the Human Rights Violations and Violent Acts that Have Caused Suffering to the Guatamalan
People), cited in Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 463, 624 (1995).
18. Eva Hoffman, The Uses of Hell, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2000, at 19, 22 (reviewing
PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999)).
19. HALBWACHS, supra note 10, at 183.
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Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,° illustrate the degree
to which
[slociety from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in
thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to
shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are
that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not
21
possess.
For most racial and ethnic groups in the United States, the memory
of "their" treatment in the past is relevant to the present insofar as it plays
a fundamental role in the constitution of present group identity.22 For instance,
a significant part of Jewish identity entails a sense of belonging to a
religious/cultural group that suffered the horror of the Shoah. Similarly, the
living memory of their people being subject to chattel slavery in the United
States forms a central aspect, for many people, of what it means to be African
American.23 Indeed, the ritualized memory of ancestors' escape from pogroms,
famine, boat lifts, war, or political unrest performs an ongoing role in the
present identity of many ethnic groups in the United States.24 Self-knowledge
is incomplete, or better yet, impossible without access to the memory of that
historical injury. The challenge for Delgado and Stefancic, chroniclers of the
past for present purposes, is to demonstrate how civil litigation can place both
guilt and repentance at the center of a reconstituted collective memory in
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. HALBWACHS, supra note 10, at 51.
22. Nora made a similar observation:
[The] "law of remembrance" has great coercive force: for the individual, the discovery of roots,
of "belonging" to some group, becomes the source of identity, its true and hidden meaning.
Belonging, in turn, becomes a total commitment.... The psychologization of memory makes
each individual feel that his or her salvation ultimately depends on discharging a debt that
can never be repaid.
1 NORA, supra note 13, at 11.
23. Indeed, some will go even further and make the argument that collective memory of past
mistreatment is all that constitutes the group itself. More than a few members of the lesbian and gay
community have wondered whether lesbian or gay identity is itself an artifact of the collective memory
of historical homophobia. Anthony Appiah makes similar arguments with respect to the ontological
integrity of African American identity-that it should be regarded as an epiphenomenon of racism
itself. See K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUSNESS: THE POLITICAL
MORALITY OF RACE 32 (1996) ("[I]f we are to move beyond racism, we shall have, in the end, to move
beyond current racial identities."); see also PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL
CULTURE BEYOND THE COLOR LINE 97-106 (2000).
24. In many respects, this mirrors Michael Novak's idea of an ethnic group:
It is a group with historical memory, real or imaginary.... Ethnic memory is not a set of events
remembered, but rather a set of instincts, feelings, intimacies, expectations, patterns of emo-
tions and behavior; a sense of reality; a set of stories for individuals-and for the people as a
whole-to live out.
MICHAEL NOVAK, THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE
SEVENTIES 47-48 (1972).
such a way as to keep that memory alive as the justification for prospective
relief.
If "[memory is always a phenomenon of the present, a bond tying us to the
eternal present; [then] history is a representation of the past."2 History, unlike
memory, is a representation of events now completed. "History ... is
the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no
longer .... History... calls for analysis and critical discourse."26 Historians
provide a narrative coherence to the past; they string it together and organize
it into topics, what some have referred to as "mnemonic reference points,"27
such as wars or economic upheavals. This is not to say that history can
boast any greater claim to objectivity than memory, but rather that history
is self-consciously a story we tell about and coherence we give to a period or
epic now over. History is behind us, memory lives on with us.
While these distinctions between history, memory, and remembrance
gain far from a consensus among either historians or sociologists,28 they provide
some useful insights to assist in the evaluation of the normative force of Delgado
and Stefancic's project. It bears noting that while their research is quite vast
and comprehensive, in the end it is marshaled in the service of a rather modest
legal claim: Accepting that the diversity justification for affirmative action
is a dead letter in U.S. constitutional law, they intend to provide the empirical
documentation that will justify race-conscious educational policies as reme-
diation for past discrimination. Framing their efforts here as a kind of "Brandeis
Brief,"29 they seek to make the case that endemic, persistent, and sweeping
racial discrimination has characterized all stages in California's evolution from
the first westward expansion to the present day. In this respect, Delgado and
Stefancic have undertaken an enormous project. But to bound this immense
work in such a way that it is handed to a court as "California's history of
racial injustice," is to risk its rejection on grounds of relevance. Rightly or
wrongly, for the most part, history is not justiciable. Federal courts demand
to be presented with live controversies, not stories from the past that might
be illuminating but do not frame the particularized, present, and individualized
25. 1 NORA, supra note 13, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Hutton, supra note 12, at 382.
28. See Nathan Wachtel, Memory and History: Introduction, 2 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY
207, 211-17 (1986) (providing a critical perspective on the significance of Maurice Halbwachs's theory
of collective memory). The dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.
provided the occasion for much scholarship on the distinctions between individual memory, remem-
brance, and collective memory. For one interesting discussion of the evolution of the relationship
between memory and history, see Leon Wieseltier, After Memory: Reflections on the Holocaust Memorial
Museum, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1993, at 16.
29. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1, at 1527.
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fault of a particular defendant that our legal system demands. Just as there
is no such thing as group libel in the United States, so too, courts are loath
to assert jurisdiction over diachronic, structural harm perpetrated against a
"people." While advocates like Delgado and Stefancic may not agree with
these rules of judicial engagement, the practical utility of their Brandeis
Brief must be assessed according to these meager criteria.
The difficulty of this task is illustrated by the efforts that have been
undertaken elsewhere to bring a society to terms with evil and injury from
its own past. Ordinarily, national collective memory is comprised of a set of
mythic stories told proudly about national heroes, momentous events, and
founding and refounding moments, laid atop a complex system of repressed
social dramas, horrors, and humiliating inconsistencies.30 Notwithstanding
a history of conquest, slavery, and structural discrimination, America is
officially known to Americans as the land of the free and the home of the
brave. We boldly send freedom fighters to defend democracy in Central
America, and invade Kuwait to "keep freedom's light alive."3' Although
virtually every modern nation was born of violence, conquest, or brutality,
"[florgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial
factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies
often constitutes a danger for [the principle] of nationality."32 Given the cen-
trality of national pride to any notion of national identity and memory, Mark
Osiel asks, "[I]s it possible, whether by legal judgment or other means, to
construct group identity upon shared recollection of moral failure?"33 Francis
Fukuyama has questioned the degree to which "a national identity can be built
on guilt and repentance, bereft of the ordinary pride of other nations."34
Osiel demonstrates that those cultures that have seriously undertaken
an accounting for their past evil have done so through what he describes as
a clear break with the past.3" War crimes prosecutions, truth and reconciliation
30. "[T]he essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also
that they have forgotten many things." Ernest Renan, What is a Nation?, in NATION AND NARRATION
8, 11 (Homi K. Bhabha ed., 1990). Recently authenticated stories about Thomas Jefferson's sexual
liaisons with Sally Hemings represent one of these tragic moments of rupture when a long-repressed
fact bursts forth to shatter collective memory. See, e.g., ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND SALLY HEMINGS: AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY (1997); see also DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN,
HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996) (provoking
a similar disruption in Germans' collective sense of themselves).
31. Gaylord Shaw, Bush Speaks Loudly, But Few Hear, NEWSDAY, Aug. 30, 1990, at 15.
32. Renan, supra note 30, at 11 (alteration in original).
33. Osiel, supra note 17, at 588.
34. Francis Fukuyama, The War of All Against All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, § 7 (Book
Review), at 7 (reviewing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW
NATIONALISM (1994)).
35. See Osiel, supra note 17, at 588-623.
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commissions, and similar public devices that provide the opportunity for a
society to acknowledge guilt and to move on, do so by constructing a moment
of rupture, a decisive break with a hideous past. At best, the concrete remedies
these moments have enabled is the imprisonment of guilty individuals, repara-
tions, or amnesty. These forms of cultural reckoning, if you will, are accom-
plished through a process by which the individual evildoers are lanced from
the body politic. Once so purged, the culture moves forward, having been
ritually cleansed of the guilt from the past national pride; pride that while
wounded, nevertheless remains intact. Fukuyama is probably right that the
people must persist in the belief of the nation's goodness. When confronted
with moral failure, the badness can be isolated and excised through a kind of
social disassociation that makes a "them" out of the "us" who threatened to
disrupt our sanguine sense of collective identity.
In the end, the ugly stories from the past recounted by Delgado and
Stefancic may not provide the jurisdictional predicate for ongoing affirmative
remedies such as those that they seek through civil litigation. Civil litigation
demands present, live injury and fault on the part of the parties and institutions
named in the complaint-something the rupture cuts off because the misdeeds
are treated as those that belong to a history now repudiated. As such, it
seems that the sort of public reckoning they seek may not be amenable to civil
litigation because the rupture with the past that enables a people to acknowl-
edge moral failure necessarily relegates that failure to a period that has been
broken off from the present. Inevitably, the moral reckoning that Delgado
and Stefancic seek is accompanied by a kind of cultural disassociation that
would render the dispute nonjusticiable.
Delgado and Stefancic's project can be understood as the present deploy-
ment of the past in the service of remedies in the future. As "memory work-
ers,"36 they seek to illuminate the degree to which the injuries of the past
continue to be borne by the children of the present, such that the right to
redress now and in the foreseeable future is justified by the ongoing victim
status of African, Mexican, and Asian Americans living in California. By
undertaking the work of modifying our collective memory of California's
past, they link memory, identity formation, legitimacy, and moral order in
such a way that they struggle to control the future by managing the past.
However, the redress objectives of the Delgado and Stefancic Article may be
best served by treating their project as management of memory rather than
as documentation of history.
36. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE
MEMORY 67 (1994).
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While history tells a story about who we were, of events now completed,
memory provides the foundation upon which we build a present, temporal
identity that reaches both forward and backward in time. Delgado and
Stefancic's California's Racial History challenges us to know peoples of color
in California as victims of an ongoing pattern of discrimination. This knowl-
edge, grounded in an enhanced familiarity with California's racial past, then
justifies a right to redress both in the present and in the future. The ignoble
past of which they remind us is not one that should be relegated to a now
foreclosed history, but rather dynamically persists in the lives of contemporary
Californians of color.
If ethnic and racial memory plays such a significant role in shaping ethnic
and racial identity, and in forming the normative justification for prospective
affirmative amends to ethnic and racial minorities in California, then, of course,
Delgado and Stefancic present us with a dilemma that resides in any such
strategy of identity-based remediation. People of color are entitled to affirma-
tive redress so long as their collective ethnic identities are comprised, at least
in significant part, by their ongoing victim status. It is these "wounded attach-
ments," or "states of injury," to borrow a frame from Wendy Brown,37 that serve
as the normative predicate for prospective relief in such a regime of rights.
"[Ploliticized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion.., because
it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity.... [I]t installs
its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundation of its political claim,
in its demand for recognition as identity."38 From this vantage point, Delgado
and Stefancic risk constructing affirmative action as a lieu de m~moire, that is,
as a symbolic site that ritualizes, commemorates, and overdetermines people
of color as victims.39 Memory shapes identity, identity shapes status, and from
status are rights derived. Peter Novick's concerns about the role of the Holo-
caust in modem American Jewish identity presses a similar point: "[E]thnicity
is seen as the main characteristic of social identity, historical catastrophe
serves as the warrant of group legitimacy, and 'the status of victimhood' becomes
proof of moral innocence and rectitude. 40
These sorts of strategies lay a trap: By naming and normalizing injury as
status, it becomes difficult to imagine a future beyond that injury. "Politicized
identity ... can hold out no future-for itself or others-that triumphs over
37. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 52-76
(1995).
38. Id. at 73-74.
39. See 1 NORA, supra note 13, at 14-20. "[T]he fundamental purpose of a ieux de nrimoire is
to stop time, to inhibit forgetting, to fix a state of things, to immortalize death, and to materialize the
immaterial (just as gold, they say, is the memory of money) ... ." Id. at 15.
40. Hoffman, supra note 18, at 22.
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this pain."41 Of course, Delgado and Stefancic encounter this trap largely
because they choose to frame their project within the tiny window of equality
left open by the Rehnquist Court. But there they are, nevertheless. The
ongoing justification for prospective affirmative action resides in the persistent
status of the injured parties as victims. Thus, ethnic and racial minorities are
incentivized by such a regime of rights to structure past injury as presently
constitutive. They trod into the future facing backwards with the eye of mem-
ory fixed on an inglorious and injurious past, dependent upon the prospective
vitality of that past injury-always in sight and never to be forgotten-as the
predicate for the ongoing payment of reparations. This backward-facing march
into the future may be the only viable legal strategy the Supreme Court has
left for us, but as marching orders for a progressive movement, its peril is rather
obvious.
Maybe that is the best that we can do with the current state of affairs
of rights. But it seems to me that if someone were to devote her intellectual
and cultural resources to the project of amends, and she were invested in
gaining an accounting for past injury, she might be inclined to invest as much
capital in the construction of a revised collective memory of perpetrators as
that of victims. The retelling of "our" stories of injustice necessarily entails
the retelling of "their" tales of innocence. If the present identity and status of
peoples of color is built on the injuries of the past, thus rendering them a class
to whom a debt is owed, surely we should undertake the same project of
(re)constructing the class who owes the debt. A demand for reparations that is
grounded in a legacy of disadvantage may well be fortified by the illumination
of the legacy of privilege that is its flip side.
II. RETURN OF THE NATIVE
Whereas Delgado and Stefancic seek amends for racial injustice as part
of a larger project of building a "fair and just society"42 in which peoples of
color are fully integrated into the dominant institutions of public and civil
society as citizens of the United States, Tsosie has no such aspirations for her
people-the Indian nations who continue to reside in what is now the United
States. Rather, she makes the argument for reparations for Indians as part
of a larger project of restoring Indian people to their rightful place within
independent sovereign nations. Indeed, U.S. citizenship and inclusion within
41. BROWN, supra note 37, at 74.
42. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1, at 1614.
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American culture is tantamount to genocide for native peoples, according to
Tsosie.43
Issues of identity and rights play as critical a role in Tsosie's project as
they do for Delgado and Stefancic. For native peoples, treaties and the rights
they engender are obligations sacred in nature on account of the political
identity they presuppose. Tsosie seeks to distinguish a native, sovereign pre-
conquest political identity for Indian nations, from the hybrid cultural identity
asserted by Mexican American beneficiaries of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. Whereas Indians possessed an intact independent political identity
that enabled them to enter into various treaties with European colonists
concerning claims to North American soil, the pedigree of Mexican Americans
can be traced to the exchange of Mexican national identity for U.S. identity
accomplished by these treaties. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo offered
U.S. citizenship to former Mexican nationals residing in the territory that
became part of the United States under that treaty, whereas Indians entered
into treaties with the United States not in order to broker U.S. citizenship,
but rather to manage the allocation of disputed claims to land between inde-
pendent sovereign people-Indian nationals and U.S. nationals. Indians were
the subjects of their treaties, whereas Mexican Americans were the objects
of treaties entered into by other contracting parties on their behalf. After
all is said and done, argues Tsosie, the treaties between the United States and
Indian nations serve as evidence of the integral political identity of the Indian
nations, while the treaties affecting Mexican Americans created or transformed
their political identity by virtue of positive law.
Tsosie has offered a fascinating postcolonial account of the significance
of treaty making to the different cultural and political identities of North
American Indians and Mexican Americans. Tsosie contrasts the hybridity
of Mexican Americans with the singular sovereign identity of Indians. An
assimilation narrative lies at the heart of most American success stories, and
by Tsosie's account, that holds true in many respects for Mexican Americans.
But not so for Indians-at least this is what she wants to resist. U.S. citizen-
ship, assimilation, and reservationizing of Indians have brought about the
harshest of colonial annihilation of Indian peoples. The Indian of today is an
abject simulacrum of the authentic precontact Indian whom Tsosie seeks to
rehabilitate.
If Delgado and Stefancic risk the paradox of collapsing injury and iden-
tity, Tsosie has a different set of perils with which to contend. Surely we can-
not return to the premodern period that serves as Tsosie's baseline of political
integrity. What would intact modern indigenous cultures look like? How
43. See Tsosie, supra note 2, at 1657.
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would we know we were looking at one? Does "modem" bear an oxymoronic
relationship to "indigenous"? How is progress possible for indigenous peoples
living as minorities among otherwise colonizing nations? How can the identity,
practices, and internal norms of an indigenous group change over time in such
a way that the group can claim stewardship over those changes-particularly
when that group is culturally embedded within an imperialist nation?
44
The challenge for a project like Tsosie's is to sidestep the pull of a self-
Orientalizing impulse. That is, by insisting upon the authenticity of a pre-
contact political identity, she runs the risk of fetishizing the primitive in such
a way that conflates progress, cultural evolution, and change with assimilation,
inauthenticity, and genocide. If the history of Indians in the postcontact
era is one of cultural annihilation and forced denunciation of their "identity
as the original inhabitants of lands, 45 what would a modern Indian nation
look like in the absence of this history? In many respects, the reparations
move suggested by Tsosie risks stripping Indians of any history and freezing
their political identity at some imagined moment prior to contact corruption.
Only those vestiges of what is canonized as a classical set of political arrange-
ments and values deserve to be owned as properly Indian.
Yet, this is exactly the move made by colonists who formed the subject
of Edward Said's Orientalism critique:
Renan had called the Semites an instance of arrested development,
and functionally speaking this came to mean that for the Orientalist
no modern Semite, however much he may have believed himself to
be modern, could ever outdistance the organizing claims on him of
his origins. This fundamental rule worked on the temporal and spatial
levels together. No Semite advanced in time beyond the development
44. In this sense, the puzzle of identity with which Tsosie is struggling resembles that posed
by Theseus' ship:
The ship of Theseus is constructed of wooden planks. Over the years, some of the planks
become worn and are replaced by new planks. Eventually, all the planks are replaced;
nonetheless, we would not object to identifying the resulting ship as the ship of Theseus.
Indeed, if someone were now to discover and reassemble the discarded planks into the original
configuration, we would probably hesitate to declare the reassembled planks the ship. We
might say that part of what it means to be the ship of Theseus today is to have come
through the continuous experience of the past. Nevertheless, our linguistic practice leaves
open the possibility that one might refer to either ship as the ship of Theseus. Whether we
prefer one or the other depends upon the reason we have for caring about the ship of
Theseus.
Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory,
85 GEO. L.J. 1857, 1859 n.13 (1997); see also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS
33 (1981) (explaining that each and every plank can be replaced and the ship remains the same, if
the progression is gradual); 1 THOMAS HOBBES, THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF
MALMESBURY 136-37 (William Molesworth ed. & George Grote trans., Scientia Verlag Aalen
1966) (1655).
45. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 1639.
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of a "classical" period; no Semite could ever shake loose the pastoral,
desert environment of his tent and tribe. Every manifestation of actual
"Semitic" life could be, and ought to be, referred back to the primitive
explanatory category of "the Semitic."46
Tsosie's challenge is to delineate a cultural political identity for Indians
that is separate from, rather than subsumed under, U.S. identity, and to deline-
ate that identity in such a way that distinguishes from a cultural imperialism
by which "the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective
of one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's group
and mark it out as the Other."47 David Theo Goldberg describes this Oriental-
izing gaze as one by which "[tihe Primitive assumed synonymy with the racial
Other, a technical nomenclature for a popular category.... Formally, primitive
societies were theorized in binary differentiation from a civilized order .... [T]he
Civilized have a history, but the Primitive have none: their histories are frozen."
48
According to what standard or set of criteria can one differentiate the
imperialist stereotype from the native truth? How can Tsosie stake out an Indian
identity that is "other-than" European culture, yet not "Other" in the way Young
and Goldberg use the term as epithet?
CONCLUSION
Whereas Delgado and Stefancic aspire to manage memory in such a way
that the past is connected to the present by an unbroken filament that illumi-
nates the present in constructive ways, Tsosie seeks to short circuit a sort of "mid-
dle passage" that was corrupted by imperialism and jump back to a premodem
time when Indians were truly sovereign of their own destinies. But Tsosie's
act of imagination can lay no greater claim to authenticity than any other.
There is no winning a contest that is set up in such a way that precolonial
truth is the only weapon by which one can vanquish the inauthenticity of
imperialism.
Of course we must refuse the terms of such a duel, because the only way
we know precontact political identity is as it has been passed on through the
46. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 234 (1979); see also Eugenio Abellera Cruz, Note,
Unprotected Identities: Recognizing Cultural Ethnic Divergence in Interpreting Title VII's 'National
Origin' Classification, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 185 n.141 (1998) ("ITihis process can be
analogized to the European colonial experience which involved constructing a primitive 'other' which
allowed the 'West' to define a contrasting identity as 'progressive,' which was then used to justify colo-
nialism and imperialism.").
47. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 1656 (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE 58 (1990)).
48. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 156-57 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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years as managed remembrance or collective memory. That chain of custody
of our pasts is all we have when it comes to constructing collective and
individual identities-we either ignore it or hold it with a death grip at our
peril. Yet, while memory creates an emotional and epistemic link to our pasts,
the normative projects these authors have undertaken demand a critical analy-
sis that memory alone does not offer.
No doubt the key to Indian sovereignty on the one hand, and ethnic and
racial justice in California on the other, lies somewhere in between the surgical
removal of imperialist injury that underlies Tsosie's project, and the permanent
grafting of that injury onto ethnic identity that Delgado and Stefancic offer.
These two papers make tremendous contributions to the project of understand-
ing race at the end of the twentieth century. They do so not only for the
contributions they make to what we know about our racial past, but also for
the tough questions they suggest in the telling.
